Launching a new online service is usually associated with innovation, growth, and attracting new users. However, developers who build public internet tools often face a different reality: the first people to discover their service are not always legitimate users. Cybercriminals are too often the first one there! They actively monitor the web for newly launched platforms that lack proper security protections, hoping to exploit them before effective safeguards are introduced.
This is exactly what happened to independent developer Maya Kyler when she launched y.gy, a brand new URL shortener, in February 2024. Originally designed to support her side project getwaitlist.com, the service offered an attractive combination of features: no registration, unlimited free usage, custom short links, analytics, and a lightweight API. The objective was to provide a simple and fast alternative to established URL shorteners such as Bitly and TinyURL.
Instead, the project rapidly became an unexpected cybersecurity case study. Less than 24 hours after its public launch, cybercriminals had already begun abusing the platform to distribute phishing campaigns, demonstrating how quickly malicious actors identify and exploit newly available online services.
- A Service Designed for Simplicity
- The First Attacks Arrived Within Hours
- Comparing y.gy With Established URL Shorteners
- Building a Multi-Layered Defense
- Geo-Phishing Made Detection More Difficult
- The Scam Warning Page Became a Powerful Deterrent
- What Do We Know About the Hackers?
- Reducing Abuse by Adding Friction
- Why URL Verification Matters
A Service Designed for Simplicity
Maya deliberately removed as much friction as possible from the user experience. Anyone could create a shortened URL instantly without creating an account or paying for a subscription. The platform also included analytics and a lightweight API, making it attractive to both developers and everyday users.
- No signup required
- Unlimited free URL shortening
- Custom URL slugs
- Built-in analytics
- Developer-friendly API
- Modern and easy-to-use interface
Unfortunately, those same characteristics also appealed to cybercriminals. Anonymous access, instant link creation, and the absence of historical abuse detection made the platform an ideal candidate for phishing campaigns.
The First Attacks Arrived Within Hours
Only a few hours after the public launch, attackers began generating malicious shortened URLs pointing to fraudulent websites. Many of the first phishing pages impersonated Microsoft Online, attempting to steal usernames and passwords by reproducing Microsoft's login interface with remarkable accuracy.
This immediately highlighted an important reality of today's internet: attackers often target newly launched public services because they usually have fewer abuse prevention mechanisms.
Rather than slowly building a community of legitimate users, y.gy quickly found itself being abused for phishing campaigns.
Comparing y.gy With Established URL Shorteners
Instead of assuming that every URL shortener faced identical problems, Maya compared the same malicious URLs across several competing services.
The results were revealing. Platforms such as Bitly and TinyURL were already blocking many of these phishing links because they had accumulated years of threat intelligence, blacklists, and automated security mechanisms. Since y.gy had only just been launched, it had none of these protections.
This experience demonstrated that, since developers have leaned to protect their older services, launching a new public one without abuse prevention will almost automatically attract attackers.
Building a Multi-Layered Defense
Rather than shutting down the project, Maya decided to strengthen its security step by step. Instead of relying on a single protection mechanism, she combined multiple defensive techniques that complemented one another.
| Security Measure | Purpose | Benefit |
|---|---|---|
| Domain-level filtering | Block entire abusive hosting platforms | Helps prevent malicious links from being created |
| Public Scam Warning page | Replace dangerous redirects with a warning | Protects users while discouraging attackers |
| Behavior monitoring | Detect suspicious attack patterns | Improves future filtering rules |
| Stripe verification | Reduce anonymous abuse | Adds identity friction without heavily affecting legitimate users |
One of the first improvements was domain-level filtering. Rather than blocking malicious URLs individually, Maya identified hosting platforms repeatedly abused by phishing campaigns. Entire domain patterns such as *.replit.app could therefore be blocked before attackers generated thousands of individual links.
Interestingly, she also observed that abuse was not evenly distributed across hosting providers. Platforms such as Webflow and Squarespace were far less frequently associated with phishing campaigns, allowing her filtering strategy to remain selective instead of indiscriminately blocking legitimate services.
Geo-Phishing Made Detection More Difficult
One of the most sophisticated techniques discovered during the investigation involved geo-phishing. Certain shortened URLs did not serve identical content to every visitor. Instead, attackers analyzed the visitor's IP address before deciding which page to display.
For example, users visiting from Europe or Canada could receive an entirely legitimate website, while visitors connecting from the United States would instead be redirected to a phishing page requesting Microsoft credentials.
This approach significantly complicated automated detection because scanners located outside the targeted region could incorrectly classify the destination as safe. Several of these campaigns also generated alerts from infrastructure providers including Cloudflare and Amazon Web Services (AWS), confirming that attackers were relying on sophisticated hosting infrastructure rather than simple personal websites.
The Scam Warning Page Became a Powerful Deterrent
This approach achieved several objectives simultaneously. First, it immediately protected users by preventing them from reaching dangerous websites. Second, it publicly exposed malicious campaigns instead of silently deleting them, making abuse much more visible both to users and to the service operator.
According to Maya Kyler, the characteristic "signatures" associated with many phishing campaigns gradually disappeared after the Scam Warning page was introduced. While it is impossible to know exactly why attackers moved away, the warning page appears to have significantly reduced the attractiveness of y.gy for phishing operations by replacing malicious destinations with a clear security warning instead of allowing the attack to succeed.
What Do We Know About the Hackers?
As the attacks continued, Maya noticed recurring patterns that suggested the work of organized cybercriminals rather than isolated individuals experimenting with a new service. Most malicious users relied on automated bots capable of generating large numbers of shortened URLs within minutes, allowing entire phishing campaigns to be deployed almost instantly.
The campaigns most frequently impersonated well-known online services, including:
- Microsoft Online
- PayPal
- Apple
The objective was always the same: convince victims that they were logging into a trusted website before stealing their credentials.
The hosting infrastructure used by the attackers also revealed several recurring characteristics. Many phishing pages were deployed on newly registered domains or temporary hosting services that could easily be abandoned once detected. Maya repeatedly encountered malicious websites hosted on Replit subdomains, Cloudflare Workers, and disposable hosting providers, making detection considerably more challenging.
Among the phishing campaigns she analyzed, some targeted users of popular online services such as Outlook and Gmail. Combined with the use of automated bots, disposable infrastructure and rapidly changing domains, these campaigns demonstrated a level of organization that went far beyond isolated attacks.
Taken together, these observations suggest that the attacks relied on automation, disposable infrastructure and techniques designed to evade both human users and automated security systems.
Reducing Abuse by Adding Friction
One of the biggest lessons learned during the project concerned anonymous access. Initially, allowing anyone to create shortened URLs without registration was considered one of y.gy's greatest strengths. In practice, it also became one of its greatest weaknesses.
To limit abuse, Maya eventually introduced a paid model using Stripe. The goal was not primarily to generate revenue but to introduce a small amount of identity verification. Since Stripe already includes fraud detection and reputation systems, requiring payment helped reduce anonymous abuse on the platform while remaining relatively transparent for legitimate users.
This illustrates an important principle of cybersecurity: introducing even a small amount of friction can significantly reduce malicious activity without seriously affecting honest users.
Why URL Verification Matters
The y.gy incident demonstrates why users should avoid blindly trusting shortened links. Because the destination is hidden, it is impossible to know whether a link leads to a legitimate website or a phishing page without first expanding it.
Tools such as CheckShortURL allow users to inspect shortened links safely before opening them. Instead of immediately visiting the destination, users can review valuable information such as the original destination URL, a preview screenshot, the page title, metadata, and several security indicators that help identify suspicious websites before clicking.
For developers, security researchers, and everyday users, this additional verification layer can help identify suspicious links before sensitive information is exposed.
The experience of y.gy also illustrates a broader reality of today's internet. Whether the service is a URL shortener, a file-sharing platform, or any other public web application, security should be considered from the very beginning rather than added after attackers have already discovered the platform.
